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Abstract 
We re-examine the abnormal returns (ARs) around merger announcements using a large 
sample of 8,945 announcements. We estimate the ARs using the Carhart (1997) four-
factor model under the standard ordinary least square (OLS) method and the Glosten et 
al.’s (1993) asymmetric GARCH specification (hereafter, GJR-GARCH). Under the OLS 
method, acquirers do not generate significant cumulative ARs (CARs) in line with prior 
work. Our new results, however, show that under the GJR-GARCH estimation, acquirers 
generate positive and significant cumulative CARs. We attribute the gains to the use of 
the GJR-GARCH estimation method, as the GJR-GARCH method is more effective in 
capturing conditional volatility and asymmetry in the excess returns.
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INTRODUCTION 
1 There are a number of review studies in the areas that take on different perspectives. For 
example, Haleblian et al. (2009) consolidate the materials from management, economics, 
finance, accounting and sociology. Tuch and O’Sullivan (2007) review short- and long-run 
performance of firms engaged in M&As deals. Napier (1989) reviews the materials from a 
human resource perspective. 
2 Aslinger and Copeland (1996) find increases in acquires’ value of 14.3% above the S&P 
500 index (see also Savor and Lu, 2009; Martynova et al., 2007). However, Sharma and Ho 
(2002) report that M&As have an insignificant effect on the adjusted operating performance 
of firms. Bild et al. (2002) also conclude that up to 30% of the pre-acquisition value of U.K. 
firms is destroyed following the completion of M&As (see also Dickerson et al., 1997).
There is no doubt that the area of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has 
been heavily researched1. However, the empirical findings are not always 
consistent. To date, accounting and finance researchers provide definitive 
answers on the economic gain arising from M&As deals. For example, 
the finance literature indicates that acquirers’ abnormal returns (ARs) 
around merger announcements are either zero or negative and significant 
(Campa & Hernando, 2006; Dutta & Jog, 2009; Stunda, 2014). These re-
sults hold fairly consistent, except when targets are unlisted (Faccio et al., 
2006; Fuller et al., 2002). Only targets tend to consistently generate posi-
tive ARs (Goergen & Renneboog, 2004). The empirical results are mixed 
in accounting research2. The economic question is: Why do acquirers un-
dertake M&As deals that do not generate gains to their shareholders?
This paper focuses on the estimation issues around the determination 
of the ARs. How the ARs are estimated is important as it affects infer-
ences about the gains to shareholders in M&As deals. Using the bid 
price observed in capital markets is the most appropriate measure of 
the gains to shareholders (Grinblatt & Titman, 2002). This is because 
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managers and executives have less control over capital markets, thereby causing market valuations to 
be more representative of true value3. Uncertainty about both the acquirer and target prices can dictate 
the form of payments, which, in turn, can affect the ARs. Myers and Majluf (1984) indicate that a share 
exchange occurs if acquirers believe that their shares are overvalued. Thus, adverse selection on the part 
of acquirers could lead to an exchange of acquirer’s own stocks with targets, so that target shareholders 
share the risk of overpayment (Eckbo & Thorburn, 2000). 
The next section briefly discusses the theories underpinning mergers and acquisitions deals and relates 
them to existing evidence. Sections 2 discuss the methodologies in prior work. Section 3 presents our 
data and research methodology. Section 4 presents empirical results and we conclude in the final section.
3 The argument relies on rational behavior and market efficiency. However, stock prices around M&As announcements can be mis-priced 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 2003; Bi & Gregory, 2011). From an accounting perspective, both acquirers and targets can manipulate their earnings 
(see Erickson & Wang, 1999), and/or institute conditions that enhance their valuations. Besides the target price, a lot of the discretionary 
accounting items at the point of revaluation and consolidation are under the control of managers.
4 This is a fairly consistent result, although Wong et al. (2009) report positive ARs for acquirers of Asian countries. In addition, Dutta and 
Jog (2009) and Dutta et al. (2013) report positive ARs for acquirers in cross-border studies. The latter result can occur if information 
asymmetry exists across markets. 
5 These exceptions are studies that examine acquirer returns when targets are private and/or not listed. These studies report positive ARs 
for acquires (see Faccio et al., 2006; Fuller et al., 2002). It is useful to acknowledge that private and/or unlisted targets do not have market 
valuations or reference points. Thus, they may be undervalued. Similarly, asymmetric information is more pronounced in capital markets 
when targets are not listed. 
1. REVIEW OF PRIOR WORK
Economies of scale and cost effectiveness – The mo-
tives for M&As often include a desire to achievement 
economies of scale and greater cost effectiveness. 
Reynolds and Teerikangas (2016) suggest that firms 
use M&As for strategic expansion and to develop 
new competences and capabilities. Finance theory 
suggests that M&As take place to increase sharehold-
ers’ wealth and take over control of poor performing 
firms. So, M&As will take place in efficient markets 
under rational conditions. Empirical studies show 
that acquirer shareholders do not gain in M&As 
deals. Acquirers’ ARs tend to be negative (Chatterjee, 
2011; Alexandridis et al., 2010)4. The exception is 
when acquirers bid for non-listed targets (see Faccio 
et al., 2006; Fuller et al., 2002)5. While these studies 
do not necessarily emphasize the economies of scale 
and cost effectiveness motive for mergers, the gener-
al result is that the acquirers’ ARs are not positive. In 
contrast, most empirical studies document positive 
ARs for targets (Fuller et al., 2002), suggesting that all 
of the gains go to target shareholders. 
Economic impact of mergers and acquisitions – The 
economic impact of M&As is significant as they af-
fect several interest groups, i.e., employees and cred-
itors. Studies that investigate the economic and so-
cial effects of mergers suggest that M&As have pro-
long negative repercussions due to lay-offs following 
mergers (Blonigen & Pierce, 2016). M&As can also 
lead to excessive market concentration and contrib-
ute to price increases and reduction in consumer 
welfare (Carletti et al., 2015). Other studies suggest 
that restructuring following M&As help safeguard 
the workforce of targets (see Inoue et al., 2010). Other 
studies suggest that M&As enhance operational effi-
ciency of firms (Carline et al., 2009). 
Synergy motive – Synergy theory suggests that M&As 
take place due to the economic benefits of unification 
following mergers. Dutordoir et al. (2014) report that 
disclosing synergy forecasts prior to mergers leads to 
an increase in returns. M&As also take place to ex-
ploit financial (Leland, 2007) and operational (Lewis 
& Webb, 2007) synergies. 
2. EMPIRICAL MODELS, 
ESTIMATION 
METHODS, AND TESTS 
OF STATISTICAL 
SIGNIFICANCE 
Empirical models of the ARs – Essentially, a well-
specified benchmark model is needed to generate the 
ARs. Fama and French (1996) state that the choice of 
benchmark model can have important implications 
17
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for the size of ARs. Several different model specifi-
cations are used in empirical work, including: (i) the 
market model (see Goergen & Renneboog, 2004); 
(ii) the adjusted market return (Faccio et al., 2006; 
Alexandridis et al., 2010); and (iii) the Fama and 
French (1993) three factor model (Gregory, 1997; 
Kothari & Warner, 1997; Draper & Paudyal, 2006). 
We use the Carhart (1997) four-factor model since 
it appears to improve the specification of the Fama 
and French (1993) three-factor model. 
Estimation methods of the ARs – Prior studies typi-
cally use linear estimation methods, including the 
standard OLS to generate the ARs (Alexandridis 
et al., 2010). Periods around mergers are very vol-
atile, which can in turn affect the estimated pre-
dicted values associated with the ARs. Thus, using 
linear estimation methods will generate inefficient 
parameter estimates. The GARCH-type estima-
tion methods are more appropriate since they cap-
ture the conditional volatility and asymmetry in 
the ARs (Baillie & Bollerslev, 1989). In this study, 
we estimate both the standard OLS and the asym-
metric GARCH of Glosten et al. (1993) (hereafter 
GJR-GARCH) as a way of illustrating this issue. 
Tests of statistical significance – The volatility clus-
tering in the ARs can lead to overrejection of the 
null hypothesis of zero ARs. Several statistical 
tests have been put forward to deal with this prob-
lem (Boehner et al., 1991). Kolari and Pynnonen 
(2010) modify the Boehner et al.’s (1991) t-statistic 
(hereafter, the BMP t-statistic) to reduce the effects 
of event-induced volatility and cross-correlation. 
Thus, we use this test in our analysis. 
3. DATA AND  
METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Sample selection  
and descriptive statistics 
We identify US M&As using the Thomson Financial 
Securities Data Company’s (SDC) Database over 
the period January 1, 1991 to December 31, 2013. 
Similar to Moeller et al. (2005), we require that: 
(i) each merger announcement leads to successful 
completion and that there are less than 1,000 days 
between the announcement and completion; (ii) 
the deal value is one million dollars or more and 
the deal value relative to the market capitalization 
of acquirer is more than 1%; (iii) the acquirer is 
publicly quoted nonfinancial U.S. firm listed on the 
NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ; (iv) the acquirer also 
has financial and accounting data on the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat 
databases; (v) the target is a U.S. public or private 
nonfinancial firm; and (vi) the acquirer controls less 
than 50% of shares of the target at the announce-
ment day, but ends up with 100% on completion.
Following Chang (1998), we include only firms with 
M&As announcements in the event window. We ex-
clude acquirers with stock prices below two dollars at 
the announcement date. Our final sample compris-
es 8,945 successful M&As made by 2,970 acquirers. 
Following Martin (1996) and Fuller et al. (2002), the 
sample is divided according to the payment meth-
ods: (i) cash payment including combinations of cash, 
debt, and liabilities; (ii) stock payment including 
common stock and combination of common stock, 
options or warrants; and (iii) mixed payment includ-
ing combinations of common stock, cash, debt, pre-
ferred stock, convertible securities.
The descriptive statistics for the market capitaliza-
tion of acquirers and deal value in each announce-
ment year are shown in Table 1. The mean market 
capitalization of acquirers is 2.86 billion dollars; 
the mean deal value is 309.34 million dollars. The 
market capitalization value and the deal value in 
the 2000s are larger than those in the 1990s. Of 
the 8,945 successful mergers, 3,280 (36.67%) are 
made by cash payment, 1,278 (14.29%) are made 
by stock payment, and the rest of 4,387 (49.04%) 
are made by mixed payment.
3.2. Methodology
To capture the ARs, we first estimate the Carhart 
(1997) four-factor model over the estimation-win-
dow ( )– 240,  – 6t t  relative to the merger an-
nouncement date ,t  thus:
( ), , , ,
,
( )
,
i t f t i i m t f t
i t i t i t i t
R R R R
s SMB hHML mMOM
α β
ε
= − +
+ + + +
− +
  (1)
where , , i t f tR R−  denotes the excess daily return 
on stock ;i  , ,m t f tR R−  denotes the value-weight-
18
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 14, Issue 3, 2017
ed daily return on a market portfolio less risk-free 
rate; tSMB  denotes the difference in daily returns 
between two portfolios comprising of large and 
small sized stocks; tHML  denotes the difference 
in daily returns between two portfolios compris-
ing of high and low book-to-market (B/M) stocks; 
tMOM  denotes the difference in daily returns be-
tween two portfolios comprising of past winner 
and loser stocks6; ,i tε  denotes the error term. 
For comparison, we estimate Eq. (1) using both 
the GJR-GARCH and the standard OLS estima-
6  
, ,
,  ,  ,  and –
t t tm t f t
SMB HML MOMR R  are obtained from Kenneth R. French data library: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/
faculty/ken.french/Data_Library
tion methods. We compute the CARs over an 
11-day event window ( )– 5,  5 ,t t +  as short 
window event studies provide more reliable es-
timates of the ARs (Andrade et al., 2001). The 
 t-statisticBMP  of ,i tAR  is given as:
 ( )
,
1
1
 t-stat ,
N
i t
i t
SAR
BMP
N S SAR=
= ∑   (2)
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of M&As announced over the period 1991 to 2013
Year
Market 
capitalization Deal value
Whole 
sample Cash payment Stock payment Mixed payment
Mean Median Mean Median N N % N % N %
1991 998.96 261.65 84.02 16.66 164 34 20.73 30 18.29 100 60.98
1992 809.00 186.74 72.17 17.68 235 53 22.55 57 24.26 125 53.19
1993 756.53 195.74 77.37 18.25 328 87 26.52 67 20.43 174 53.05
1994 1,112.42 175.27 102.66 21.36 402 118 29.35 77 19.15 207 51.50
1995 1,012.94 217.45 147.86 25.33 427 110 25.76 103 24.12 214 50.12
1996 1,368.46 292.60 214.03 30.08 604 135 22.35 139 23.01 330 54.64
1997 1,184.66 302.68 149.92 27.28 734 192 26.16 136 18.53 406 55.31
1998 2,088.36 358.82 243.14 32.88 677 198 29.25 142 20.97 337 49.78
1999 4,998.87 562.05 544.51 52.50 602 141 23.42 154 25.58 307 51.00
2000 5,195.16 913.47 521.00 68.53 577 136 23.57 169 29.29 272 47.14
2001 2,821.76 607.75 501.31 50.16 358 110 30.73 56 15.64 192 53.63
2002 2,661.21 557.66 338.24 44.18 358 163 45.53 29 8.10 166 46.37
2003 2,194.27 544.32 212.03 45.28 340 145 42.65 24 7.06 171 50.29
2004 1,925.83 566.99 303.84 43.64 413 210 50.85 21 5.08 182 44.07
2005 4,017.28 576.32 478.30 47.59 407 197 48.40 17 4.18 193 47.42
2006 3,690.98 616.61 292.09 45.14 416 223 53.60 16 3.85 177 42.55
2007 4,619.02 711.67 321.66 50.49 404 201 49.75 8 1.98 195 48.27
2008 2,148.05 607.25 203.52 43.85 252 142 56.35 2 0.79 108 42.86
2009 7,166.11 611.23 784.36 44.59 206 102 49.51 13 6.31 91 44.18
2010 5,444.78 934.93 441.15 90.74 258 145 56.20 5 1.94 108 41.86
2011 4,174.26 1,072.44 447.34 82.53 268 150 55.97 2 0.75 116 43.28
2012 3,574.02 734.10 299.44 86.96 281 147 52.31 4 1.42 130 46.27
2013 3,865.62 1,142.96 424.13 113.73 234 141 60.26 7 2.99 86 36.75
1991–2000 2,231.29 325.99 251.13 31.10 4,750 1,204 25.35 1,074 22.61 2,472 52.04
2001–2010 3,506.20 611.20 372.49 47.98 3,412 1,638 48.00 191 5.60 1,583 46.40
2011–2013 3,866.61 994.41 387.33 90.48 783 438 55.94 13 1.66 332 42.40
1991–2013 2,860.74 476.74 309.34 40.16 8,945 3,280 36.67 1,278 14.29 4,387 49.04
Note: This table shows the mean and median market capitalization for acquirers and their deal values around M&A announce-
ments. The deal value is one million dollars or more and the deal value relative to the market capitalization of the acquirer is not 
less than 1%. The market capitalization of the acquirer equals the share price one month previous to the merger announcement 
times the number of common shares outstanding. The deal value is defined as the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer, 
excluding fees and expenses. We adjust the market capitalization and the deal value using the annual CPI (2001 = 100), provided 
by the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistic. The yearly mean and median values are displayed in million dollars. 
The acquirer is a U.S. public listed firm, while the target is a U.S. public or private firm, or its subsidiary. The stock price of ac-
quirers is not below two dollars. The final sample is comprised of 8,945 merger announcements made by 2,970 unique acquirers.
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where  ( ) ( )2,
1
1
;
1
N
t i t t
i
S SAR SAR SAR
N =
= −− ∑  
,
1
1
.
N
t i t
i
SAR SAR
N =
= ∑  Here, ,i tSAR  denotes the 
standardized ( ) AR SAR  for stock i  at day ,t  
while  ( )tS SAR  denotes the cross-sectional stan-
dard deviation of SAR  at the event day t  (Brown 
and Warner, 1985). For multi-day intervals ( ) days ,T  the  t-statisticBMP  is the ratio of 
the average CAR  to its estimated standard 
deviation:
 ( )21
1
 t-stat ,
T
T
T
t
T
t
CAR
BMP
S CAR
=
=
=∑
∑
 
 (3)
where 
 ( ) ( )2,
1
1
.
1
N
T i T T
i
S CAR CAR CAR
N =
= −− ∑
The adjusted  t-statisticBMP  due to Kolari and 
Pynnӧnen (2010) is given as:
( )
1
 t-stat
1 1
r
BMP
n r
−× + −  , (4)
where ( )
1
1 1
r
n r
−
+ −  is the correlation factor for 
the adjusted  t-statistic.BMP  r  is the average of 
sample cross-correlations of estimation-period 
residuals. 
Table 2. Average AR measures for acquirers and targets around merger announcements using the 
four-factor CAPM under the OLS method and the GJR-GARCH method
Days
OLS estimation method GJR-GARCH estimation method Wilcoxon signed-ranks test
ARs CARs SCARs t-stat ARs CARs SCARs t-stat ARs CARs SCARs
Panel A: Acquirers
–5 0.178 0.178 0.977 0.13 0.352 0.352 3.763 0.51 2.44b 2.44b 5.22a
–4 0.042 0.220 2.722 0.37 0.238 0.590 8.463 1.15 5.22a 6.54a 4.59a
–3 0.306 0.526 6.837 0.93 0.490 1.080 8.160 1.10 5.68a 7.56a 5.22a
–2 0.281 0.807 8.354 1.13 0.403 1.483 10.675 1.56 4.76a 7.09a 4.91a
–1 0.108 0.915 7.060 0.95 0.269 1.752 11.982 1.66c 5.83a 8.51a 4.59a
0 0.204 0.204 4.885 0.67 0.338 0.338 12.669 1.97b 4.84a 4.84a 6.55a
1 0.349 0.349 6.247 0.85 0.523 0.523 12.061 1.76c 6.55a 7.90a 6.12a
2 –0.018 0.331 8.345 1.13 0.136 0.659 11.548 1.57 6.13a 9.20a 6.40a
3 –0.282 0.049 –6.969 –0.95 –0.088 0.571 –4.205 –0.57 7.31a 9.85a 4.91a
4 –0.156 –0.107 –5.945 –0.81 –0.001 0.570 –3.130 –0.42 6.41a 10.28a 6.83a
5 –0.040 –0.147 2.968 0.40 0.115 0.685 7.381 1.00 5.83a 11.48a 5.83a
Panel B: Targets
–5 0.038 0.038 1.335 0.25 0.048 0.048 3.787 0.72 1.78c 1.78c 4.75a
–4 0.058 0.096 –3.483 –0.66 0.071 0.119 –0.721 –0.14 2.78a 3.00a 3.78a
–3 –0.037 0.059 –4.883 –0.93 –0.030 0.089 –3.552 –0.67 1.94c 3.72a 3.61a
–2 0.142 0.201 –0.558 –0.11 0.210 0.299 2.536 0.48 2.84a 4.13a 6.55a
–1 0.019 0.220 5.183 0.98 0.057 0.356 7.759 1.67c 2.45a 4.10a 2.40b
0 1.717 1.717 16.213 2.47b 2.473 2.473 18.138 2.87a 2.15b 2.15b 2.29b
1 0.613 0.613 12.138 2.10b 0.687 0.687 14.230 2.50b 1.95c 1.95c 4.11a
2 0.021 0.634 6.079 1.16 0.039 0.726 8.549 1.76c 2.06b 2.23b 3.94a
3 0.079 0.713 3.619 0.68 0.116 0.842 4.812 0.91 2.96a 4.10a 2.93a
4 0.003 0.716 –4.711 –0.89 0.045 0.887 –3.138 –0.60 3.69a 4.65a 2.87a
5 –0.173 0.543 –6.133 –1.16 –0.154 0.733 –4.767 –0.90 2.71a 5.12a 2.76a
Note: This table presents the ARs estimates for acquirers and targets around merger announcements us-
ing the Carhart (1997) four-factor model under the OLS and GJR-GARCH estimation methods. The adjusted 
BMP -statistict  due to Kolari and Pynnӧnen (2010) is used to test statistical significance. The Wilcoxon signed-
ranks statistic tests for differences in the ARs over the estimation methods. a, b, and c denote the statistical signif-
icance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
AND DISCUSSIONS 
4.1. ARs for acquirers and targets 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the estimated ARs. Under 
the OLS method, the CAR of 0.204% (p-value ≥ 0.10) 
is insignificant at day .t  None of CARs are significant 
under the OLS in line with previous studies (Lang et 
al., 1989; Hackbarth & Morellec, 2008; Alexandridis 
et al., 2010). However, under the GJR-GARCH, the 
CARs are positive and significant (p-value ≤ 0.10) 
over the –1t  to 1t +  window. Indeed, acquirers 
gain a significant CAR of 1.130% over the 3-day win-
dow under the GJR-GARCH method, while the OLS 
generates an insignificant CAR of 0.661% (p-val-
ue ≥ 0.10) over the –1t  to 1t +  window. 
Panel B of Table 2 shows the corresponding results 
for targets. Over the two-day window t  to  1 ,t +  
the CAR of 2.33% is positive and significant un-
der the OLS method, corroborating prior results 
(Goergen & Renneboog, 2004). The GJR-GARCH 
still outperforms the OLS method. Here, the CARs 
are significant over the four-day window –1 t  to 
 2.t +  The Wilcoxon signed-ranks test rejects the 
null hypothesis that the magnitude of the AR are 
similar for both estimation methods (p-value ≥ 0.05). 
Furthermore, Table 3 shows that using bootstrap-
ping, the simulated CARs are similar to those esti-
mated under the OLS and GJR-GARCH methods.
4.2. ARs and payment methods
Following Myers and Majluf (1984), high value ac-
quirers tend to make cash payment or a large pro-
Table 3. Bootstrapping simulations of AR measures for acquirers and targets around merger 
announcements
Days
OLS estimation method GJR-GARCH estimation method
ARs CARs SCARs ARs CARs SCARs
Actual Boot. Actual Boot. Actual Boot. Actual Boot. Actual Boot. Actual Boot.
Panel A: Acquirers
–5 0.178 0.174 0.178 0.174 0.977 0.988 0.352 0.365 0.352 0.365 3.763 3.796
–4 0.042 0.044 0.220 0.218 2.722 2.703 0.238 0.243 0.590 0.608 8.463 8.416
–3 0.306 0.297 0.526 0.515 6.837 6.865 0.490 0.475 1.080 1.083 8.160 8.202
–2 0.281 0.285 0.807 0.800 8.354 8.383 0.403 0.398 1.483 1.481 10.675 10.644
–1 0.108 0.113 0.915 0.913 7.060 7.049 0.269 0.263 1.752 1.744 11.982 12.011
0 0.204 0.205 0.204 0.205 4.885 4.909 0.338 0.328 0.338 0.328 12.669 12.646
1 0.349 0.340 0.349 0.340 6.247 6.289 0.523 0.538 0.523 0.538 12.061 12.033
2 –0.018 –0.016 0.331 0.324 8.345 8.360 0.136 0.130 0.659 0.668 11.548 11.510
3 –0.282 –0.289 0.049 0.035 –6.969 –6.953 –0.088 –0.092 0.571 0.576 –4.205 –4.218
4 –0.156 –0.160 –0.107 –0.125 –5.945 –5.927 –0.001 0.001 0.570 0.577 –3.130 –3.137
5 –0.040 –0.041 –0.147 –0.166 2.968 3.042 0.115 0.120 0.685 0.697 7.381 7.351
Panel B: Targets
–5 0.038 0.054 0.038 0.054 1.335 1.368 0.048 0.038 0.048 0.038 3.787 3.777
–4 0.058 0.074 0.096 0.128 –3.483 –3.445 0.071 0.064 0.119 0.102 –0.721 –0.735
–3 –0.037 –0.04 0.059 0.088 –4.883 –4.895 –0.030 –0.031 0.089 0.071 –3.552 –3.544
–2 0.142 0.228 0.201 0.316 –0.558 –0.561 0.210 0.215 0.299 0.286 2.536 2.563
–1 0.019 0.051 0.220 0.367 5.183 5.138 0.057 0.070 0.356 0.356 7.759 7.757
0 1.717 1.772 1.717 1.772 16.213 16.298 2.473 2.506 2.473 2.506 18.138 18.147
1 0.613 0.703 0.613 0.703 12.138 12.173 0.687 0.673 0.687 0.673 14.230 14.256
2 0.021 0.041 0.634 0.744 6.079 6.136 0.039 0.030 0.726 0.703 8.549 8.581
3 0.079 0.083 0.713 0.827 3.619 3.671 0.116 0.124 0.842 0.827 4.812 4.826
4 0.003 0.008 0.716 0.835 –4.711 –4.735 0.045 0.052 0.887 0.879 –3.138 –3.103
5 –0.173 –0.186 0.543 0.649 –6.133 –6.177 –0.154 –0.171 0.733 0.708 –4.767 –4.750
Note: This table presents the average ARs measures, i.e., ARs, CARs, and SCARs, for acquirers (in Panel A) and targets (in 
Panel B) around merger announcements using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model under the OLS method and the GJR-
GARCH method. The corresponding simulated returns (boot.) around merger announcements are based on the nonpara-
metric bootstrapping simulations using 1,000 runs with replacements for each estimation method.
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portion of cash payment to close the deal, to signal 
the higher value of their stocks. Adverse selection 
on the part of acquirers can cause them to exchange 
stocks, as this allows targets to share the risk of 
over-payment using cash (Eckbo & Thorburn, 2000). 
This argument suggests that acquirers will make 
stock payment to shareholders of targets when there 
is high uncertainty about market value of targets. 
In contrast, acquirers will make cash payment when 
there is high uncertainty regarding their own mar-
ket value. This means that payment methods will af-
fect the magnitude of the CARs. So we analyze the 
ARs according to the method of payments. 
Table 4 shows the estimated ARs for acquirers ac-
cording to the payment methods. Under the OLS 
method, the CARs are positive and significant 
(p-value ≤ 0.10) when cash payments are made, 
Table 4. Average ARs measures around announcements for acquirers by payment method
Days
OLS estimation method GJR-GARCH estimation method Wilcoxon signed-ranks test
ARs CARs SCARs t-stat ARs CARs SCARs t-stat ARs CARs SCARs
Panel A: Cash payment
–5 0.200 0.200 0.370 0.09 0.675 0.675 4.645 1.13 4.73a 4.73a 4.41a
–4 0.068 0.268 7.358 1.00 0.491 1.166 7.494 1.47 3.14a 3.49a 3.14a
–3 0.431 0.699 9.817 1.44 1.105 2.271 9.057 1.58 2.49b 2.29b 2.69a
–2 0.324 1.023 8.047 1.25 1.160 3.431 11.823 1.95c 3.96a 3.14a 4.73a
–1 0.203 1.226 10.814 1.86c 0.518 3.948 11.605 2.01b 2.29b 2.41b 3.14a
0 0.277 0.277 11.687 1.97b 0.632 0.632 12.272 2.16b 5.43a 5.43a 3.14a
1 0.580 0.580 8.634 1.37 0.831 0.831 9.865 1.89c 5.41a 5.41a 5.43a
2 –0.045 0.535 3.194 0.60 0.200 1.030 3.869 0.66 3.14a 3.14a 3.96a
3 –0.433 0.102 –2.894 –0.50 –0.132 0.898 0.030 0.01 3.50a 3.49a 3.50a
4 –0.216 –0.114 0.040 0.01 –0.004 0.894 3.566 0.61 4.41a 4.49a 4.14a
5 –0.017 –0.131 –6.530 –1.11 0.274 1.168 –0.129 –0.02 3.96a 3.41a 3.96a
Panel B: Stock payment
–5 0.042 0.042 4.380 1.04 –0.239 –0.239 2.851 0.50 1.77c 1.77c 2.33b
–4 –0.079 –0.037 4.071 0.95 –0.056 –0.295 2.078 0.30 2.21b 2.59a 2.31b
–3 0.169 0.132 4.623 1.10 –0.493 –0.788 2.003 0.35 2.77a 2.44b 2.77a
–2 0.664 0.796 4.126 0.98 –1.250 –2.038 2.962 0.53 2.05b 2.29b 2.01b
–1 –0.018 0.777 4.325 1.02 –0.084 –2.122 2.926 0.52 1.78c 1.89c 2.01b
0 –0.032 –0.032 –0.528 –0.21 –0.016 –0.016 –0.704 –0.14 2.44b 2.44b 2.88a
1 0.101 0.101 –0.188 –0.05 –0.101 –0.101 –0.909 –0.26 2.23b 2.23b 2.21b
2 0.078 0.179 –3.076 –0.73 –0.289 –0.389 –1.920 –0.34 2.51b 2.01b 2.77a
3 –0.142 0.037 –4.914 –1.08 –0.099 –0.489 –2.024 –0.39 2.12b 2.01b 2.88a
4 –0.126 –0.089 –5.915 –1.27 0.061 –0.428 –2.358 –0.45 2.51b 2.77a 2.21b
5 –0.065 –0.153 –4.944 –1.22 –0.867 –1.295 –3.137 –0.56 2.21b 2.51b 2.21b
Panel C: Mixed (cash and stock) payment
–5 0.204 0.204 1.713 0.61 0.308 0.308 5.607 0.64 4.49a 4.49a 5.01a
–4 0.061 0.265 0.838 0.21 0.151 0.459 5.534 0.63 5.18a 4.29a 4.46a
–3 0.259 0.524 4.366 1.09 0.362 0.821 7.959 1.17 5.18a 4.66a 5.71a
–2 0.129 0.653 3.830 0.92 0.385 1.206 9.648 1.44 5.37a 4.10a 4.83a
–1 0.080 0.733 5.487 1.45 0.203 1.409 10.916 1.73c 4.67a 4.29a 5.54a
0 0.225 0.225 6.849 1.57 0.240 0.240 13.235 1.93c 4.83a 4.83a 5.86a
1 0.262 0.262 5.256 1.47 0.498 0.498 12.642 1.76c 4.66a 4.66a 5.36a
2 –0.029 0.233 4.366 1.12 0.223 0.721 7.784 1.30 5.03a 4.83a 4.83a
3 –0.218 0.015 2.531 0.63 –0.053 0.668 4.021 0.46 5.18a 4.66a 5.18a
4 –0.122 –0.107 –1.866 –0.46 –0.018 0.650 –3.283 –0.44 6.35a 4.49a 6.65a
5 –0.049 –0.155 3.242 0.80 0.309 0.959 4.938 0.56 5.37a 4.66a 5.01a
Note: This table presents the average ARs estimates under the Carhart (1997) four-factor CAPM using the OLS and GJR-
GARCH estimation methods. Panels A, B, and C present the results for cash payment, stock payment, and mix (cash and 
stock) payment, respectively. The adjusted BMP -statistict  due to Kolari and Pynnӧnen (2010) is used to test statistical sig-
nificance. The Wilcoxon signed-ranks statistic tests for differences in the ARs over the estimation methods. a, b, and c denote 
the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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in line with previous studies (Heron & Lie, 2002; 
Fuller et al., 2002; Alexandridis et al., 2010). These 
CARs are only significant over the  –1t  to t  win-
dow. Under the GJR-GARCH method, the CARs 
are positive for both cash and mixed payments (p-
value ≤ 0.10). Indeed, the significant CARs span 
up to 4-day window –1t  to t  for cash payment. 
The significant CARs for mixed payment sug-
gest the stock market attributes higher rewards to 
acquirers for sharing the risk of the M&As. The 
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test confirms that the 
CARs under the estimation methods have differ-
ent medians (p-value ≤ 0.05).
Corresponding results for targets are shown in 
Table 5. The CARs are positive and significant 
across the payment methods, except for stock pay-
ment. As before, the persistence in the CARs is 
much stronger under the GJR-GARCH method. 
The Wilcoxon signed-ranks test also confirms that 
the CARs different under the estimation methods 
(p-value ≤ 0.05).
Table 5. Average AR measures around announcements for targets by payment method
Days
OLS estimation method GJR-GARCH estimation method Wilcoxon signed-ranks test
ARs CARs SCARs t-stat ARs CARs SCARs t-stat ARs CARs SCARs
Panel A: Cash payment
–5 0.072 0.072 1.298 0.44 0.082 0.082 7.646 1.75 3.25a 3.25a 3.41a
–4 0.125 0.197 4.164 1.13 0.096 0.179 8.346 1.15 5.55a 4.46a 3.16a
–3 –0.050 0.146 3.268 1.14 0.031 0.210 9.202 1.08 4.16a 5.55a 4.25a
–2 0.203 0.349 4.494 1.44 0.450 0.660 8.843 2.06b 5.89a 6.02a 5.19a
–1 0.028 0.377 10.631 1.72c 0.112 0.772 11.215 2.63a 6.27a 6.02a 6.25a
0 2.188 2.188 16.537 2.71a 2.790 2.790 14.394 3.15a 5.16a 5.16a 5.19a
1 0.975 0.975 11.250 1.98b 0.963 0.963 9.549 2.33b 4.45a 4.45a 3.25a
2 0.032 1.007 5.168 1.20 0.061 1.023 9.384 2.20b 5.05a 6.51a 4.16a
3 0.120 1.127 4.390 1.04 0.125 1.148 5.231 1.20 4.89a 6.82a 4.25a
4 0.006 1.133 1.030 0.25 0.088 1.237 6.968 1.61 3.27a 6.41a 3.25a
5 –0.283 0.850 0.710 0.18 0.053 1.290 6.261 1.51 3.22a 6.95a 5.01a
Panel B: Stock payment
–5 –0.090 –0.090 –0.749 –0.19 –0.045 –0.045 –0.573 –0.26 2.39b 2.39b 2.55b
–4 –0.143 –0.232 –1.176 –0.34 –0.048 –0.093 –2.080 –0.41 2.06b 2.77a 2.06b
–3 0.011 –0.221 –1.209 –0.36 –0.021 –0.113 –3.034 –0.67 2.77a 2.39b 1.97b
–2 –0.033 –0.254 –1.480 –0.45 –0.317 –0.431 –5.248 –0.99 1.97b 2.13b 3.97a
–1 0.004 –0.250 –1.856 –0.69 –0.021 –0.452 –5.398 –1.20 2.77a 2.77a 2.45b
0 –0.876 –0.876 –6.350 –1.51 1.014 1.014 –5.759 –1.43 3.39a 3.39a 2.77a
1 –0.448 –0.448 –3.187 –0.60 –0.324 –0.324 –3.821 –0.96 2.13b 2.13b 2.18b
2 –0.006 –0.454 –3.278 –0.55 –0.034 –0.358 –4.171 –1.05 2.55b 3.39a 5.57a
3 –0.018 –0.471 –3.463 –0.45 –0.032 –0.390 –4.266 –1.02 2.01b 3.39a 2.01b
4 –0.007 –0.478 –3.228 –0.39 0.078 –0.312 –3.622 –0.89 2.74a 2.77a 2.45b
5 0.137 –0.341 –1.948 –0.25 0.068 –0.244 –2.604 –0.76 2.01b 2.77a 2.74a
Panel C: Mixed (cash and stock) payment
–5 0.044 0.044 1.082 1.09 0.035 0.035 4.496 1.43 2.56a 2.56a 2.86a
–4 0.059 0.103 2.282 1.12 0.063 0.098 4.805 1.53 3.11a 2.35b 2.35b
–3 –0.033 0.070 1.694 0.27 0.014 0.112 5.550 1.41 2.75a 2.35b 3.09a
–2 0.117 0.187 3.835 1.22 0.242 0.353 7.270 1.52 2.88a 2.71a 2.53b
–1 0.012 0.200 4.739 1.51 0.051 0.404 9.091 1.85c 2.17b 2.71a 2.83a
0 1.753 1.753 10.093 2.41b 1.758 1.758 14.030 2.48b 2.79a 2.79a 2.82a
1 0.532 0.532 9.670 1.93c 0.546 0.546 10.503 2.06b 2.90a 2.90a 3.54a
2 0.017 0.549 6.856 1.55 0.032 0.578 8.723 1.73c 2.80a 2.61a 3.38a
3 0.060 0.608 5.476 1.50 0.053 0.631 6.655 1.63 2.80a 2.71a 3.20a
4 0.003 0.612 4.571 1.45 0.051 0.681 5.411 1.48 3.27a 2.71a 2.87a
5 –0.148 0.464 3.616 1.15 0.047 0.729 4.937 1.57 2.86a 3.35a 2.56a
Note: This table presents the average ARs measures similar to Table 3 but for targets. The Wilcoxon signed-ranks statistic tests 
for differences in the ARs over the estimation methods. a, b, and c denote the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.
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CONCLUSION
The event study methods are popular in the assessment of the economic benefits of mergers. There are 
issues around model specifications and the use of appropriate statistical tests. This study employs the 
Carhart (1997) four-factor model to estimate the ARs for U.S. firms around merger announcements. 
The Carhart (1997) four-factor model is estimated under both the OLS and GJR-GARCH estimation 
methods. The OLS method generates results that are generally in line with prior work. The GJR-GARCH 
method generates significant CARs for both acquirer and targets. Both estimation methods indicate 
that the use of stock payments does not generate positive CARs. In general, we show that the choice of 
the estimation methods impacts on the results. We suggest that the GJR-GARCH estimation method 
should be used especially when the daily CARs are estimated. 
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